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STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the decision of the Board 
of Review of the Industrial Commission of the 
Utah Department of Employment Security. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. THE PENALTY PROVISIONS OF 35-4-5(e) OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY ACT SHOULD 3E INTERPRETED AS GIVING THE BOARD DISCRETION 
TO IMPOSE RESTITUTION AND A CIVIL PENALTY OF AN AMOUNT UP TO BUT 
NOT TO EXCEED THE BENEFITS THE CLAIMANT RECEIVED BY DIRECT REASON 
OF HIS FRAUD. 
II. THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE EXIDENCE. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Claimant - Appellant Roger H. Mattson ( hereafter 
"claimant") filed an initial claim for unemployment insurance 
benefits effective January 27, 1985. His weekly benefit amounted 
to $186.00. Claimant filed claims for benefits each week between 
January 27 and August 3, 1985. R. 63. It is the weeks ending 
February 2, February 23, March 16 through April 13, May 11 through 
May 25, and June 15 through July 12, 1985 which are the subject of 
this appeal. 
As a result of the information contained on the claim 
cards, he received waiting week credit for the calender week ended 
February 2, 1985 and $2604 in unemployment benefits for the weeks 
ended February 23, March 16 through April 13, May 11 through May 2 5 
and June 15 through July 13, 1985. R. 59. 
Information subsequently received showed the claimant had 
provided services as an independent contractor, as a consulting 
engineer beginning January 7, 1985. The claimant accepted 
contracts with R. A. Wilson as shown on the table below. R. 54 
The table reflects the contract number, the beginning and ending 
dates, of the contract, the amount paid to the claimant (excluding 
travel) and the date paid. 
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Sub-Contract 
0083-0001 
Beginning Ending 
Date Date 
Amount Paid Date 
(Exc. Travel) Paid 
01 
03 
05 
06 
10 
11 
13 
20 
23 
25 
28 
1-07-85 
1-14-85 
1-31-85 
2-12-85 
3-14-85 
4-02-85 
5-08-85 
5-07-85 
6-14-85 
6-14-85 
6-28-85 
1-17-85 
1-31-85 
2-15-85 
2-25-85 
3-30-85 
4-15-85 
5-23-85 
5-31-85 
6-24-86 
6-24-85 
7-15-85 
$352.00 
495.00 
308.00 
275.00 
330.00 
308.00 
704.00 
176.00 
176.00 
176.00 
440.00 
3-05-85 
2-05-85 
3-05-85 
3-05-85 
4-05-85 
5-05-85 
6-14-85 
6-14-85 
7-03-85 
7-03-85 
8-01-85 
Due to the apparent discrepany between information submitted 
by the claimant on his claims and that submitted by his employer, 
a hearing was held by a Hearings Officer on October 2, 1985. On 
advice of his attorney, claimant did not testify or offer any infor-
mation regarding the issues at hand. The Hearings Officer issued a 
decision on October 11, 1985 denying employment insurance benefits 
for the calendar weeks ended February 2, February 23, March 16 through 
April 13, May 11 through June 1, June 22, July 13, 1985 and for 49 
additional weeks commencing October 13, 1985 and ending September 20, 
1986, on the grounds the claimant knowingly withheld material infor-
mation in order to receive unemployment insurance benefits to which 
he was not entitled. This decision created an overpayment in the amount 
of $2,511.00 plus the Hearings Officerlevied a civil penalty in the 
like amount which the claimant was held liable to repay. 
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On October 18, 1985 claimant filed an appeal to the Appeals 
Tribunal from the decision of the Hearings Officer. A hearing was 
held on November 13, 1985 by an Administrative Law Judge. Based on 
the testimoney and documents entered into the record, the ALJ issued a 
decision on February 28, 1986 modifying the decison of the Hearings 
Officer by increasing the overpayment and civil penalties up to $5,394. 
R. 81, 82, 83, 84 
On March 10, 1986 the claimant filed an appeal to the Board 
of Review from the decision of the ALJ. On April 4, 1986 the Board 
of Review affirmed the decision of the ALJ. R. 90 
The claimant filed a Petition for Writ of Review with the 
Utah Supreme Court on April 22, 1986. On August 27, 1986 , 
Attorney for claimant, submitted a letter to the Department of 
Employment Security requesting reconsideration by the Board of 
Review, R. 94 
On September 26, 1986 the Utah Supreme Court dismissed the 
claimant's appeal to the Court on the grounds the claimant failed to 
proosecute his appeal. 
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Sometime in February 1990, claimant's request for reconsider-
ation was brought to the attention of the Attorney for the Board of 
Review. On March 6, 1990 the matter was returned to the Board of 
Review to consider the contentions raised by claimant's attorney. 
On March 8, 1990 the Board of Review issued a decision reaffirming 
its previous decision which adopted the ALJ ! s decision. R. 96, 97 
On April 6, 1990 claimant filed a Petition for Writ of 
Review with the Utah Court of Appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PENALTY PROVISIONS OF 35-4-5(e) OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY ACT SHOULD BE INTERPRETED AS GIVING THE BOARD DISCRETION 
tO IMPOSE RESTITUTION AND A CIVIL PENALTY OF AN AMOUNT UP TO 
BUT NOT TO EXCEED AN AMOUNT EQUAL TO THE BENEFITS THE CLAIMANT 
RECEIVED BY DIRECT REASON OF HIS FRAUD. 
The statute provides: 
"Each individual found in violation of this subsection shall 
repay to the Commission the amount of benefits the claimant 
actually received, and, as a civil penalty, an amount equal 
to the benefits the claimant received by direct reason of 
his fraud." 
- 5 -
The present law as enumerated by DiPrizio vs Industrial 
Commission Board of Review 572.2d 679 (1977) and relying on 
Decker vs. Industrial Commission 533 P 2d 898 (1975) is that the 
statute is mandatory. By the use of the word "shall" whenever fraud 
is shown the administrative judge is compelled in addition to resti-
tution to levy a civil penalty (punitive damages) of an amount equal 
to the benefits received. 
It is the position of the petitioner that the Decker case 
and the DiPrizio cases are bad law and should be overruled. The 
Decker case was a unanimous decision made in 1975. By 1977 when 
DiPrizio was written, two out of five Utah Supreme Court justices 
were in favor of overruling Decker. It is submitted that the 
justices of the present court might very well, thirteen years later, 
find it in their minds and hearts to cast their votes for more 
justice for the employee and more latitute and discretion for the 
administrative agency within guidelines of an upper limit as 
imposed by the statute. 
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It us hoped that -»-v^ respondent :::clustna. : 
»"ead i r,q this brief w : ' * - - : r oet i t lorier ' s argumen-. At -e" s.. 
petitioner is in rea. _• ^.N . . f •* >-> ir.terrMftefi *~n 
a: ve ' v'^  aa::: -is^rr;''? judges ana * n^ Scare •-: Review TIC J * -J> . 
*" - lu mak^ decision'- v^ ev . w : "ustioe ra'ner tr.ari 
ones tr.at ar- ;r::..ex:ble, aro:*"rary. - -> . : 
Perhaps *-\s** ad^ersa10: ^  ; nat\;r^ it trie system w * _ i prevent: P.e:-;pondevV -; 
aUor^e; : . • , rest assured, ine agency ho 
represents would :'e Detter oir i ;.t .id. 
"t-^; n o n s on p^hltiv^ j^ .m-^ e-'i being n.'iJe cumr.11 y require 
an inflexible ir.terpr^* a* ;«• • . - . lenaitiei-, 
i e, , puniti'.*e damage *5 ir ^n a.r/uv equa t J * ~-e oer.er.ts rece:--ou. 
' " • . ' • - circumstances a 5<^  <^ r ^u importance. vnetrier 
fie ^or.ev wa- u"- ><: :« :--d * wean's st .• , - ~. ..i. o L m g , 
tor cnari tab • <" O I ^ J O S P S , t.ir drinking or subs-ar.ee a^u^p -.-; ._ov 
imDortant a' * - * 'esent in^ercreta*"; on . 
Whetner */.e caiman* w<u. u ^:, young, ::::::::'-:, .::^t-
:.i^ --v' : • * v-?ro^-r : - suhmir^ed "'• * (~ .* 1 the above shoul : b* 
cer*"'.r.er:t * ;:a.<t.» trie ;- .• . -: . .t .-*--. -e * * 
worker dictates that "he stature snouic ><r ;. "^rpre: JC i : • 
Board ve-e rJ '-tiori as to the amount ~i civil aenalt" v. ;)e imposed. 
The Board is entitled to discretion. They should not be 
compelled to go all or nothing. The administrative judges should 
be allowed within certain limits to act as judges and not merely 
fact finders. If at all possible, the statute should be interpreted 
as defining these limits rather than dictating the fine. 
In looking at the Decker and DiPrizio cases, we see that 
the judge stated that the verb "shall1' makes the wording manda-
tory and opted to use this rule of statutory construction rather 
than several other available statutory construction rules. In 
effect, the the Court took the easy way out. They could have used 
a concept based on seeking the legislative intent based upon interpre-
ting the statute to harmonize with the purpose of the act, etc. 
It is submitted that in the DiPrizio case there are flaws even in the 
mandatory use of the word "shall.1' In reading the statute, one sees 
tne words "'shall repay1 to the Commission the amount of the benefits 
actually received." However, when it comes to the second half of the 
sentence the words "shall repay" are not used; no verb at all is used. 
It states "as a civil penalty, an amount equal to the benefits received 
by direct reason of his fraud." We have to assume that the verb for the 
second half of the sentence is "shall repay." Diagraming the sentence 
would dictate this. However, one might ask, "How can you repay monies 
that were not ever paid out?" Diagraming the sentence and adding the 
assumed verb "siiall repay" just makes no sense. As long as we have to 
read words into and out of the statute, why not read the words" 
not to exceed" rather than "shall" or "shall repay?" 
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f.^ 1 ,T5 "»" -> * 
"Neither the Commission nor +•':.. . .cur4 :: i.o cri., y»-
is as clear and unambiguous as is the one c'Lteo aoc/e 
• oi ;e Eiiett ' s ,! 
unambiguous" statute states rria*: punitive damages ;r;";: pe::a.i,es) 
-. - •- o.:- : • *• -v. ar;ir;r.r eguai "o ' in-" jer.erits receive:'! by 
"direct reasu;. -: .::u : ro* . ; •-:.*• . • ' -o'e^ •• '*:..-•+ wMf..-: what 
,a;mant receives -ito w* i' o-i- recei.es a - ~±r. _;iairect reason 
:• '•" * •''"* r--i .-* \-f f'-auo"-" A ppe J .1 an.t doers'* know , 
~or Goes tno respondent, nor i :. . ..^.. -: . •" : 
unambiguous ^ta+o;te" _:eat*es something re ne desired. 
I-- ; > . h.., i r d -ii. '. Cc:rr. :sc;oa of 
the State of Utah., Board or Review, b ;;: .-. Jo <",-••?, .ooe 
'-'" - w e n reasoned dissent ^joined in by Judge M a u g h a m , 
stated: 
"The Commission appears to have acted under the impression 
that the quoted statute makes it mandatory to impose the 
full penalty . , . . . A general rule of construction of 
statutes is that they should be so interpreted and applied 
as to harmonize with the purposes of the act of which they 
are a part. I do not see how that objective is accomplished 
by applying the section \ inder scrutiny in an absolute and 
arbitrary manner , , , Under that arbitrary view, the 
maximum penalty is mandated regardless of the amount,, or the 
i lumber of violations, or the actual loss by the State 
Unemployment Compensation, Fund . , , . It is therefore 
obvious that in some circumstances the arbitrary and 
unreasonable imposition of the maximum penalties has not 
only the potential for harshness and injustice, but it can 
defeat rather than carry out the purposes of the act . . . . 
Correlated to what has been said above about the 
desirability and propriety of so construing a statute as to 
give effect to its intent and purpose, there is the further 
rule relating to construction of statutes which confer 
powers on a governmental entity: that they give not only the 
authori ty expressly granted, but that which is im.pl i ed as 
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reasonably necessary to carry out the duties and responsi-
bilities imposed upon such entities. It is an elemental 
concept of law that some exercise of discretion, when 
imposing statutory penalties, is necessary to achieve indi-
vidualized justice. This is especially true when sanctions 
and penalties are applied by administrative agencies, when 
the power is conferred upon such agencies to investigate 
facts, weigh evidence and draw conclusionsas a basis for 
legal actions. Due to the nature of the responsibilities 
imposed upon the Commission in administering and carrying 
out the purposes of the act, it ie required to perform some 
functions of a judicial nature. Being thus invested with 
judicial powers, there should be necessarily implied therein 
the authority to exercise the judicial prerogative of acting 
in a reasonable and judicious manner in order to properly 
administer the act and accomplish its purposes. 
Accordingly, it should not be considered as invariable and 
mandatory that the maximum penalties prescribed by the 
statute be imposed. But in exigent circumstances, where the 
imposition of such maximum penalties would result in an ar-
bitrary and unreasonable injustice, as well as tending to 
defeat rather than carry out the purposes of the Act, the 
Commission should have the power to modify or suspend the 
imposition of such penalties, or the time and manner of 
reimbursement required, as the purposes of the Act and 
interest of justice may require. 
This Court should interpret the statute in such a way 
as to: Give the Commission more power to be able to modify or 
suspend imposition of penalties within the limits set by the 
statute as the purpose of the act and interest of justice may 
require. It is submitted that if thhe Court does so, it may or 
may not change the penalties levied in this particular case 
against the petitioner but it would make those penalties fairer, 
more reasonable and more judicious. 
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}Ul N" 
THE I JEHISION OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IS HOT SUPPORTED 3Y 
THE EVIDENCE. 
T h e ; y s u e - ** ^ h l " o o i n t i ~ w h e t h e r ^ h e D ^ p a r t m e p f a* tr^vpn;1 *-MI 
•P r^-1 l a ^ * - -, -nc ctiid - ^ i ^ r v " : - *• ^ : i r v - - P WM. . -< ' J , A o o e , . i r / w . r i 3~ 
i n d e p e r i U d P t , : : t r - a c t o v PL ; .* . - 3 % v * . r-* ' s 
e a r n i n g s r o r ^ a c i c " j r / r v , t w~*r< ^.arr.e- ' i t r o u g - v ; ) u t - - N - c i e r i c - i o t h e 
*• ' * .---.. • '**:ii;e is inherent a." —-M~^^r* + throws a:: 
independent -lontracto: into the same bag a~ - . : . "i 
employee. 
A.i.. ' . . a a o : \ : + ** e o '* * ^i-" * - . , - * - + a4" r e s h o u l d r e : a y 
- , . v b v *-*-'.? Ad:r : m i s t r a t; ;• *_ ^uag- . - <\ . i r .o le '.» : / J i s r e g a r c o c 
1 o e i ^ a n l ' s t e s t i m o n y a n a s p ^ e - i d ar1 : n r i e n e n d e n t c o r i t ra.r* n-• ' 3 
e a r n i n g s o v e r t h e t ; j* - i , p<~< j , . * •• re 
h ; d g e r ^ o o v e - f - d -t . : o ; : : e s e x p e r / i e d hr* + UP 7 ; e o a r t : r e n t . 1 ' 
.. •. -•.: ' , . - i- o - . t r a r ' .u ^i ic • .. i t i ^ - s h i r D 
; i n d e p e n d e n t c o n i r a c t .>: : aim :• t* e ' . n a e n c e , a : . w.n^ , . . - ; i ' , 
c a p r i c i o u s , i - d s e : f s e r v i n g •,• ' h e p a r * J :: ' - e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e : u d g e 
I + - . - . - - • , > • • ; v t ; , » < • 4t * . - t a t s r i : n i !i t ^ a t- - ^ e ~ : d o e p \p -4 
" e n d t o i n f e r t n a * ^p«v r e l a t . o : j r . : p : r . n d e p e n d e : 
t h e s a m e a s P P ^ r n . o ' f * : ' er.ri : n y e e . A f t e r a.l 1 P O < ^ o f n e r o a s e s 
i n v o l v e e m D . . v*re\- >v~:e d^o^ . . ^ : • . - - : K S e a c n p e r i o d . 
In reality, the very essence of an independent contractor is that 
he controls his own time, works when he desires and only he knows 
when. His own testimoney as to when is the most credible evidence 
on the subject and cannot be overridden by an assumption which is 
only valid under an employer/employee relationship. 
It is submitted that the evidence shows claimant owes 
$1,116.00 plus civil penalties and not $5,394.00 including civil 
penalties. 
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CONCLUSION 
;- .r+ .;r:o;._d refer this case back ; ^  trie B o a r d w~ t h 
. , *-v,0 -->r-; I o e r . a ^ .es u p o n r a t - u i a - r: :• r; -
^y ^ ~ *" + i erxeea dc/jniii t~e .ryju:' 3: a*"' trr*;. 
•M . * * ' .-- + ;:ar. 
I n f e r r I n g t h a t a n ; P. c a p e rid ^.: -.  ^  ... _ L - = -, • •*- o r ! - earnings 
are to be spread over the entire period ot t:-e 
contract, 
Respect fu] ..y Led , 
1 
>/ 
&*>*> //, •" S^#<z^-. > 'L, •' 
/^oger H. Matt son 
Pro Se 
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